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Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeulel
INTRODUCTION
There is a principle of constitutional law holding that "one legislature
may not bind the legislative authority of its successors."' The Supreme
Court recently discussed that principle at length in United States v. Winstar,
and although the case was decided on other grounds, it is clear that the
Court sees the principle as a constitutional axiom.2 When cashed out in
terms of constitutional doctrine, the principle means that legislatures may
not enact entrenching statutes or entrenching rules: statutes or rules that
bind the exercise of legislative power, by a subsequent legislature, over the
subject matter of the entrenching provision. Judges have applied this rule of
constitutional law in various settings,3 and the academic literature takes the
rule as given, universally assuming that legislative entrenchment is
constitutionally or normatively objectionable.4 The goal of the academic
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1. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 872 (1996) (citing 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *90).
2. In Winstar, the Court held that the government had breached various contracts with
financial institutions, in violation of the Contracts Clause, which the Court treated as a specific
textual exception to the anti-entrenchment principle. We discuss the relationship between
entrenchment and governmental contracts in Section II.F.
3. See, e.g., Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315, 318 (1932); Manigault v. Springs, 199
U.S. 473, 487 (1905); Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879).
4. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 124-25 n.1 (3d ed.
2000); Charles L. Black, Jr., Amending the Constitution: A Letter to a Congressman, 82 YALE L.J.
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literature has been to supply the definitive rationale for the rule, although
the theorists' favorite rationales are all different.5
Our claim is that the rule barring legislative entrenchment should be
discarded; legislatures should be allowed to bind their successors, subject to
any independent constitutional limits in force. The rule has no deep
justification in constitutional text and structure, political norms of
representation and deliberation, efficiency, or any other source. There just
is no rationale to be found; the academics have been on a fruitless quest.
Entrenchment is no more objectionable in terms of constitutional, political,
or economic theory than are sunset clauses, conditional legislation and
delegation, the creation, modification, and abolition of administrative
agencies, or any of the myriad of other policy instruments that legislatures
use to shape the legal and institutional environment of future legislation.
In Part I, we define our terms, rebut the view that entrenchment is
conceptually impossible, and argue that entrenchment is both
constitutionally permissible and, in appropriate circumstances, normatively
attractive. In Part II, we apply our analysis to a wide range of
entrenchment-related problems, including the validity of the Senate cloture
rules, the Gramm-Rudman law, legislatively enacted canons of statutory
interpretation, statutes that regulate internal congressional procedures,
government contracts, treaties, and entrenchment within the executive and
judicial branches. Part III is a brief conclusion.
I. THEORY
A. Definitions
"Entrenchment" is a promiscuous word in the academic literature. We
have to ask: entrenchment of what, as against whom, by what means? We
189, 191 (1972); David Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Bargaining in the Shadow of Democracy, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 473, 526-36 (1999); Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate:
Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379; Catherine Fisk & Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181, 247 (1997); Paul W. Kahn, Gramm-Rudman
and the Capacity of Congress To Control the Future, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 185, 194 (1986);
John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Constitutionality of Legislative Supermajority
Requirements: A Defense, 105 YALE L.J. 483, 505-06 (1995). Canonical works in political theory
also discuss the disadvantages of entrenchment. See, e.g., FRANCIS BACON, THE HISTORY OF THE
REIGN OF KING HENRY THE SEVENTH 135 (Jerry Weinberger ed., Cornell Univ. Press 1996)
(1622) (arguing that one Parliament may not "by a precedent act.., bind or frustrate a future"
Parliament); JEREMY BENTHAM, THE BOOK OF FALLACIES 82-112 (Peregrine Bingham ed.,
London, John & H.L. Hunt 1824) (purporting to expose "The Fallacy of Irrevocable Laws"). We
say little about this literature directly; it either is irrelevant to American constitutional law or else
advances generic arguments picked up by modern authors, whose anti-entrenchment arguments
we rebut in Section I.D.
5. For discussion of these authors, see infra Section I.D.
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ignore one use of the term, favored by process theorists such as Klarman,6
to mean entrenchment of officials against challengers, such as prospective
candidates, by means of rigged electoral rules, restrictions on political
speech, and so forth. By "entrenchment," then, we mean the enactment of
either statutes or internal legislative rules that are binding against
subsequent legislative action in the same form. As we will see, there may
be -constitutional arguments for distinguishing statutes from rules in
particular contexts, but there is no entrenchment-related reason for doing
so. Accordingly, we will refer to "entrenching statutes" except when we
discuss the collateral constitutional distinctions between statutes and rules.
On our definition, an ordinary law has some propositional content P-
no bicycles in the park, for example. An entrenching statute has this
propositional content plus an additional provision R which governs the
conditions under which the statute may be repealed or amended. For
example, R might say that P cannot be repealed or amended with less than a
two-thirds majority in both the House and the Senate. Thus, an entrenching
statute might say: (P) no bicycles in the park; and (R) the prohibition on
bicycles in the park cannot be repealed with less than a two-thirds majority.
In this example, the entrenchment is accomplished by prescribing
voting rules that the subsequent legislature must use, but it is important to
be clear that this is a contingent feature of the example. Commentators
sometimes assume that legislative prescription of voting rules is
coterminous with legislative entrenchment, but that is not so. The
legislative prescription of voting rules may be objectionable on
constitutional grounds unrelated to entrenchment-if, for example, the
Constitution happens to mandate majority voting and the earlier legislature
requires the later legislature to act by a two-thirds majority. Conversely, the
earlier legislature may entrench not a supermajority voting rule, but a
substantive policy. For real-world examples, consider the federal statute at
issue in Reichelderfer v. Quinn, which "perpetually dedicated" certain
public lands in the capital for use as Rock Creek Park,7 or the Ohio statute
at issue in Newton v. Commissioners, which "permanently established" the
town of Canfield as the seat of Mahoning County.! In the first case, the
Court discussed the entrenchment issue but avoided it by aggressive
statutory interpretation,9 and in the second, the Court reached the
6. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85
GEO. L.J. 491, 502 (1997). Klarman also discusses entrenchment in our sense; he calls it "cross-
temporal entrenchment" and condemns it as "inconsistent with the democratic principle that
present majorities rule themselves." Id. at 509. We critique this argument from simple
majoritarianism infra Subsection I.D.2.
7. 287 U.S. 315, 317 (1932).
8. 100U.S.548,561 (1879).
9. Reichelderfer, 287 U.S. at 318, 321.
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constitutional merits and found the entrenchment invalid;10 in neither case
was the entrenchment accomplished by prescribing voting rules. A
hypothetical analogue might be an addendum to the Endangered Species
Act 1' providing that "this statute (including this provision) may never be
repealed (even by a unanimous vote)."
The rule against legislative entrenchment has a corollary, or a
reformulation, that is usually called the "last-in-time rule" for statutes. 2
The last-in-time rule addresses an intertemporal choice-of-law problem: It
says that if a statute enacted at Time 1 squarely contradicts a statute enacted
by the same legislature at Time 2, after reconciliation through statutory
interpretation has proved impossible, the later-enacted statute is the law.
The qualifier about interpretation emphasizes that the last-in-time rule, like
the equivalent anti-entrenchment rule, is a rule of constitutional law rather
than an interpretive canon. In the regime that we argue for, by contrast,
discarding the anti-entrenchment rule entails simply that the earlier
legislature itself decides the intertemporal choice-of-law question: Whether
the later-enacted statute governs in the case of a conflict depends on what
the earlier legislature has provided. As subsequently discussed, however,
our position is quite compatible with an interpretive presumption against
legislative entrenchment in the form of a default rule holding that the later-
enacted statute governs if the earlier-enacted statute is silent on the
entrenchment question.
B. Is Entrenchment Possible?
Entrenching statutes pose two puzzles, one conceptual and the other
normative. The conceptual puzzle is whether entrenching statutes are
possible. If they are not, the normative puzzle does not need to be
addressed, so we start with the conceptual puzzle.
Consider statute PR, in which P prohibits bicycles in the park, and R
prohibits repeal with less than a two-thirds majority. The conceptual
challenge to this statute is the claim that even if judges enforced statutes in
a literal way and enforced earlier statutes as fully as later statutes, PR would
not bind a simple majority of a subsequent Congress. If the majority
believes that a statute PP that permitted bicycles in the park would violate
PR, that majority could first repeal the statute PR, enabling itself to repeal P
(that is, enact PP) without a supermajority. Indeed, one might expect that
10. Newton, 100 U.S. at 559-60.
It. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
12. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (stating that, where an
earlier and a later statute conflict, "the last expression of the sovereign will must control");
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION 1054 (3d ed. 2001) (noting the "obvious
principle" that the later-enacted statute controls).
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any statute PP that is squarely inconsistent with PR would work an implied
repeal of R, in which case PR would not in any way bind a future Congress.
The original Congress could pass an additional entrenching provision,
R', which provides that R can be repealed only with a two-thirds majority,
but then of course the next Congress could repeal R' with a simple majority,
and so on down the line. But ordinary language can handle the infinite
regress. Let the original Congress enact R*, which says that a two-thirds
majority is necessary to repeal or amend both P and R*. The statute PR* is
invulnerable to repeal. Self-reference solves the problem of infinite
regress. 3
A more serious challenge to entrenchment is the possibility of
circumventing statutes without referring to them explicitly. 4 Consider the
following alternatives to PP: (1) Bicycles are two-wheeled vehicles
manufactured before 1900; two-wheeled vehicles manufactured after 1900
are shmicycles (not governed by P); (2) police officers who give tickets to
bicycle riders in the park will be fined $1000; or, more simply, park police
officers are hereby ordered to focus their efforts on littering and to ignore
bicyclists; (3) people who are ticketed and fined for riding bicycles in the
park are entitled to a ten percent reduction in their property tax; or (4) we
hereby announce that the Jane Doe Park has been closed and reopened as
the John Smith Recreational Area (P refers to parks, not recreational areas).
Each of these statutes achieves or nearly achieves the effect of PP without
expressly contradicting PR.
Examples could be multiplied, but we do not find them as troublesome
as other authors do. Legal actors constantly must make judgments about
whether a statute conflicts with a previous or hierarchically superior
enactment. When an interpreter such as a court or legislative body decides
whether a federal law preempts a state law, whether a federal or state law
conflicts with the Constitution, or whether a transaction violates the tax
law, it must be able to identify real conflicts that are concealed by statutory
(or transactional) indirection. This task involves a well-known problem of
interpretive theory, variously labeled as a "form and substance" problem, a
"rules and standards" problem, a problem of the choice between
"textualism" and "purposivism," or a problem of "circumvention" or
13. David Strauss has suggested to us that a particular legal system might simply contain a
rule of recognition holding that entrenched statutes lacking self-reference-PR' in our example-
are effective and may not be repealed. The later legislature's two-stage repeal would then violate
the rules of the game in a straightforward way. On this view, self-reference is otiose when the rule
of recognition does allow entrenchment and inadequate when it does not. We need not decide
whether the rule-of-recognition account is superior to the self-reference account, however. So
long as either account holds, the later two-stage repeal is blocked, and the argument that
entrenchment is conceptually impossible fails. The examples of entrenching provisions that we
collect below sometimes display self-reference and sometimes do not.
14. See Eule, supra note 4, at 406 n.122.
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"evasion": If a statute in terms prohibits an action A, and someone
undertakes a formally distinct action A*, when is the similarity of purpose
or effect between A and A* sufficiently close to warrant the interpreter's
decision to treat A* as if it were A? There is nothing unique to entrenchment
in this regard. The possibility of circumvention does not supply an
objection to entrenching statutes in particular; if that possibility proved the
conceptual impossibility of entrenchment, it would also prove the
conceptual impossibility of binding future decisionmakers by means of
ordinary constitutional and statutory provisions. Entrenchment is possible if
constitutions, statutes, and contracts can bind people over time. This
assumption is sufficiently uncontroversial to justify our analysis.
Note also that none of these arguments necessarily entails that judicial
enforcement of legislative entrenchments against later legislatures is
desirable in addition to or in place of legislative enforcement. Just as in the
ordinary constitutional context, judicial review is a particular institutional
enforcement mechanism that might or might not be thought desirable and
that must be justified, if at all, by separate arguments. We take no position
here on whether courts should enforce entrenched statutes when subsequent
legislatures violate the entrenchment by enacting a contrary statute. Our
argument is simply that the subsequent legislature is bound by the
entrenchment, and that any contrary statutes are straightforwardly illegal
(assuming, as always, that the entrenched statute is not otherwise
unconstitutional). Unless one subscribes to the discredited Holmesian
position that law is to be equated with what judges do 1 -that it is
meaningless to speak of binding law apart from judicial enforcement-then
the arguments about the legality of entrenchment are analytically distinct
from arguments about the justiciability of entrenchment.
C. Reasons for Entrenchment
We have encountered the view that entrenching statutes cannot possibly
have any policy value, and therefore they either should be unconstitutional
for that reason or should not be a topic of academic debate, for no
reasonable legislature would want to enact them. To forestall these
objections, we briefly discuss some of the advantages of entrenching
statutes. All of these advantages are familiar from the literature on
constitutionalism, for an entrenching statute is like a mini-constitution in its
15. Compare Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARM. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897) (remarking that "[tihe prophecies of what the courts will do in fact... are what I mean by
the law"), with Reed Dickerson, Toward a Legal Dialectic, 61 IND. L.J. 315, 317 (1986) ("Being
preoccupied with the social pathology addressed by case law, legal minds continue to be
jurisprudentially scarred by such discredited dogmas as ... Judge Holmes' assumption that law
consists only of predictions of what courts will do.").
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self-conscious effort to control the voting practices or policy choices of
future majorities.
(1) Government commitment. Entrenchment enables a government to
make a credible commitment that it will not hold up a person (or firm or
institution or country) from whom it seeks certain actions, and thus
entrenchment makes it easier and cheaper for the government to control its
relations with other entities. The simplest example is the government debt
contract: A creditor might charge a government a lower interest rate if it
knows that a future government cannot repudiate the contract without a
supermajority vote. Recent welfare reforms similarly depend on the
government being able to commit itself to withhold transfers from people
who fail to obtain employment within the designated period of time.
(2) Within-government commitment. Entrenchment smooths
interactions among political actors within the government by enabling them
to make commitments to each other. The base-closing process is an
example: If all members of Congress agree that bases need to be closed and
that the military or an independent commission ought to decide which
bases, but each member expects to succumb to ex post political pressure
from constituents, all might be better off if they can commit themselves ex
ante. Base-closing, like Gramm-Rudman, 6 was a weak form of
entrenchment: It did not prohibit repeal by a majority, but it did try to raise
the costs of such a repeal by institutionalizing the task at hand in an agency
outside Congress. Cloture and other rules in the Senate as well as the House
are also examples of within-government commitment.
(3) Agenda control. Entrenchment permits politicians to remove
contentious issues from the agenda while they focus on other business. If, to
take an extreme example in the other direction, statutes regularly expired at
the end of the legislative session, members of Congress at the beginning of
the new session would have the opportunity to challenge earlier legislative
agreements that would otherwise be off the table. As Madison pointed out,
as the date of termination approaches, "all the rights depending on positive
laws, that is, most of the rights of property, would become absolutely
defunct, and the most violent struggles ensue between the parties interested
in reviving, and those interested in reforming the antecedent state of
property." '7 If this explanation for why laws should not expire on their own
is correct, then it follows that Congress, anticipating such a battle if a
majority but not a supermajority has the power to repeal a statute, could
have the same reasons for preferring an entrenchment. A Madisonian
16. See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-908
(1994).
17. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 4, 1790), in THE MIND OF THE
FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 230, 232 (Marvin Meyers
ed., 1973).
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conflict occurs not only when statutes expire, but also when they are up for
grabs because they command the support of less than a majority."
(4) Controlling the temporal effects of existing legislation. All statutes
have effects far in the future, and entrenchment powers give Congress a
more refined tool for controlling those effects, even in a way that enhances
the power of future majorities. Suppose Congress wants to send a signal to
foreign adversaries by committing itself to build a stronger military. One
such signal could be a large military budget accompanied by a rule that it
cannot be reduced in the future without a two-thirds majority. Another such
signal could be stationing troops in foreign countries with the knowledge
that removing them would be politically costly for future governments.
Future majorities might not want to be bound to the large military budget,
but prefer this constraint to the stationing of troops. If the current majority
is committed to one signal or the other, entrenchment enables it to choose
the first when the first is preferred by both present and future.
Entrenchment in this way smooths out the lumpiness that otherwise exists
among legislative options for influencing the future.
(5) Predictability. Many political institutions are celebrated for their
effect on the stability of government: Constitutionalism, stare decisis,
representative government, and so forth are said to make government more
predictable, and this makes it easier for individuals to arrange their affairs.
It is always immediately pointed out in response that too much stability is a
bad thing, that government should change its policies when circumstances
change. The best government reflects a balance of these competing
concerns. What is rarely pointed out is that ordinary statutes already
balance these concerns in a particular way. If statutes expired by themselves
at the end of the legislative term, government would be more flexible but
less stable. If statutes were immune to repeal, government would be less
flexible but more stable. The " default" -that statutes persist until
repealed-creates a compromise between stability and flexibility, but this
balance is more appropriate for some policy areas than others. Indeed,
Congress recognizes as much when it provides certain statutes with sunset
provisions, reflecting the view that greater flexibility than the norm is
needed in that policy area. When greater stability is needed in a particular
area, entrenchment is the appropriate response. The power to entrench gives
Congress more freedom to incorporate in law fine-grained judgments about
the correct balance between flexibility and stability.
(6) Adjusting voting rules across policy areas. Theoretical work on
voting rules shows that majority rule is not always the best decision
18. This point recalls Stephen Holmes's argument that constitutions take contentious issues
off the table. See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL
DEMOCRACY 215-18 (1995). We add that Congresses, in addition to constitutional assemblies,
can make a similar determination and implement it through entrenchment.
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procedure. The optimal procedure-majority, supermajority, or
unanimity-turns on a balance between the cost of legislative negotiation,
on the one hand, and the potential for exploitation of minority interests, on
the other. 9 Because the second kind of cost is likely to vary across policies,
the optimal voting rule will also vary. Congress might seek to implement
different voting rules or procedures for different policy areas, but if it is not
permitted to entrench the rules, they can be repealed by a simple majority,
frustrating all such efforts.
D. Conventional Objections to Entrenchment
Academics object to legislative entrenchment on the ground that it
gives the past too much power over the present. Consider our statute PR*.
The entrenchment prevents a simple majority in a future Congress from
permitting bicycles in the park. A number of reasons have been advanced to
explain the offensiveness of this practice. None is persuasive.
Below, we consider objections to legislative entrenchment rooted in
formal constitutional argument from text, structure, and history; in
democratic theory; and in public choice. We need not take a methodological
stand on the relative weights of such considerations in constitutional
argument because we hold that none of these considerations justifies an
anti-entrenchment rule.
1. Constitutional Text, Structure, and History
We first consider a range of formal objections. We assume throughout
that all entrenching statutes otherwise fall within the scope of Congress's
affirmative authority to enact legislation under the enumerated powers set
forth in Article I, Section 8, in the Necessary and Proper Clause, and in a
miscellany of other constitutional provisions."' (We likewise assume that
entrenching rules are authorized by each house's power to "[dletermine the
Rules of its Proceedings." ) If statutes are not authorized in this way they
19. The standard analysis is in JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS
OF CONSENT 63-72 (1962).
20. This assumption should be uncontroversial, particularly given the breadth of the
Necessary and Proper Clause. Given the rationales for entrenchment set out in Section I.C above,
entrenchment will often be "necessary" to the execution of federal policy on the capacious
definition given to that term in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-20 (1819),
which treats "necessary" as a synonym for "useful" or "conducive to." As for "proper," that
term at most cross-references allocations of power and supervening prohibitions established
elsewhere in the Constitution. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of
Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
Our claim is that there is no independent constitutional prohibition against entrenching statutes, so
there can be nothing "improper" about their enactment.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
16732002]
The Yale Law Journal
are unconstitutional, but for a perfectly ordinary reason unrelated to
entrenchment. Given this assumption, the question is whether there is some
special limitation, express or necessarily implied, that bars entrenching
statutes.22
a. The Article I Vesting Clause
Modem commentators, such as McGinnis and Rappaport, have
suggested that an anti-entrenchment rule derives from the "history and
structure" of the Constitution, in particular, the "traditional understanding
of the limits of legislative power." 23 It is not clear whether McGinnis and
Rappaport mean to advance an originalist argument ungrounded in any
particular constitutional text. Their reference to legislative power suggests
instead that they mean to interpolate the claimed tradition into the text of
the Article I Vesting Clause, which provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States." 24 For
completeness, we examine in turn the Vesting Clause argument, an
originalist variant, and a related Burkean argument that holds that the
antiquity of the anti-entrenchment rule warrants its adoption by modem
courts.
The initial puzzle of the Vesting Clause argument is that, on its face,
the grant of "legislative Powers" to Congress simply does not speak to the
question posed by entrenching statutes. The question those statutes pose is
how the legislative power, whatever that power encompasses, is allocated
over time to successive Congresses. The Article I Vesting Clause does not
address that question.25 It merely specifies that any particular Congress may
exercise only legislative powers, as opposed to executive or judicial
powers. No one argues that entrenching statutes, which are enacted by the
ordinary Article I process, are best understood as examples of law
execution or adjudication, powers constitutionally vested in other branches.
Commentators who root the anti-entrenchment prohibition in a
definition of "legislative Powers" must defend a more ambitious reading of
the Article I Vesting Clause. On that reading, the Clause supplies
substantive limitations on what Congress may do, beyond the separation
22. Note that the technical question is just whether the entrenching component or clause of a
statute is valid, not whether the remainder of the statute-its content-is valid. This distinction
never makes a difference to our argument, however, so for brevity we often refer in shorthand to
the question of whether "entrenching statutes" are valid.
23. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 4, at 504-05.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
25. Nor do the specific grants of power in Article I and elsewhere. When, for example, the
Constitution says that "[t]he Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce ... among
the several States," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, there is no reason to think that the provision speaks to the
allocation of commerce-regulating power across successive Congresses. Rather, it delegates to the
Congress as such a power that would otherwise reside exclusively in the states. See id. amend. X.
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and distribution of powers across branches. The textual grounds for that
more ambitious reading are, however, unpromising at best. Articles II and
III vest the "executive Power" and the "judicial Power" in the President
and the judiciary, respectively, 26 without any cross-reference to "Powers
herein granted," 27 making it at least plausible to see those Vesting Clauses
as empty vessels that must be given content by reference to implicit
background norms. Article I, by contrast, does not vest otherwise undefined
"legislative Powers" in the Congress, inviting an appeal to implied norms.
Instead, it vests in the Congress "all legislative Powers herein granted,"
and then proceeds to supply both a careful enumeration of those powers in
Article I, Section 8 and a detailed set of restrictions on those powers in
Article I, Section 9.
The last point is important. Several of those restrictions, such as the ban
on ex post facto laws, are also common-law maxims concerning the limits
of legislative power, maxims whose explicit embodiment in constitutional
text would have been unnecessary if they could simply have been treated as
implied restrictions on the grant of legislative powers. Encoding those
maxims as express rules of constitutional law suggests by implication that
the anti-entrenchment rule lacks equivalent constitutional force.
Conversely, the same English common-law jurists who condemned
legislative entrenchment also identified other constitutive features of the
legislative power that no American has ever thought to treat as implicit in
the constitutional text: An example is Blackstone's rule that "[i]f a statute,
that repeals another, is itself repealed afterwards, the first statute is hereby
revived" 2 -a rule that Congress has specifically overturned by a partially
entrenched statute, as we subsequently discuss.29 So, reading into Article I
the English common-law baseline-including the rule against
entrenchment-simultaneously proves too much and too little. Article I's
elaborate crafting of the metes and bounds of legislative authority counsels
against finding additional, implicit restrictions on statutes that (by
assumption) fall within one of the enumerated grants of power.
26. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. I ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."); id. art. Ill, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in
one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish."). We neither need nor intend to take a position on the standard question of whether the
Vesting Clause of Article II confers an independent "executive" power on the President, with the
content of that power to be inferred from background norms, or instead serves as a mere
placeholder for the specific presidential powers listed later in the same Article. See ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, LETTERS OF PACIFICUS No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 7 THE WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76, 80 (John C. Hamilton ed., New York, John F. Trow 1851) (arguing
that "[tihe different mode of expression employed in [the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and II]
serves to confirm this inference" that the authority vested in the President is not limited to the
specific cases of executive power delineated in Article II).
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (emphasis added).
28. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *90.
29. See infra Section I.D.
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And even if it were fair play to read implicit limits into Article I, we
would need a separate argument for reading in an anti-entrenchment
prohibition in particular. The literature suggests two such arguments. The
first, traceable to Blackstone, Hamilton, and Cooley, holds that each
successive legislature has equal lawmaking authority. 30 A constitutional
rule permitting legislative entrenchment violates the equal-authority
postulate, the argument runs, because it confers on upstream legislatures the
authority to enact a statute that downstream legislatures cannot repeal. But
the appeal to "equality" of authority is indeterminate. A rule that allows
each legislature to bind its successors also gives each legislature formally
equal authority over time. It might be that under a regime permitting
entrenchment, earlier legislatures will have greater de facto power than later
legislatures.3 But upstream legislatures always have greater de facto power
than downstream ones, simply by virtue of drawing on a slate that is more
nearly blank. They make policy choices that become entrenched de facto
through path dependence and inertia.
Moreover, rooting the rule against entrenchment in the equal authority
of successive legislatures is hard to square with Congress's undisputed
authority to enact laws containing sunset clauses--clauses that cause a
statute to lapse, by operation of law, after a defined period. Sunset clauses
are the mirror image of entrenching clauses and might also be said to
control the authority of later legislatures: An entrenching clause forbids the
later legislature to prevent a statute from remaining in force by an
affirmative repeal, while the sunset clause forbids the later legislature to
allow a statute to remain in force by declining to repeal. We might say that
the baselines are different because the later legislature has no constitutional
authority to accomplish its goals by inaction, but the question-begging
assumption in that argument is that the later legislature does have
30. I BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *90 ("Because the legislature, being in truth the
sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority: it acknowledges no superior
upon earth, which the prior legislature must have been, if it's ordinances could bind the present
parliament."); THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 152-53 n.3
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1878) (rooting an anti-entrenchment principle in a norm of equality
across legislatures); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed.,
1987) (noting that courts have followed the last-in-time rule because "[tihey thought it reasonable
that between the interfering acts of an equal authority that which was the last indication of its will
should have the preference"); see also Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548, 559 (1879) (holding
that entrenchment is impermissible because "[e]very succeeding legislature possesses the samejurisdiction and power with respect to [public interests] as its predecessors").
31. Note, however, that Cooley was confused when he suggested that in a regime permitting
entrenchment, "one legislature could... reduce the legislative power of its successors; and the
process might be repeated, until, one by one, the subjects of legislation would be excluded
altogether from their control." COOLEY, supra note 30, at 152. The mistake here is the suppressed
premise that "the subjects of legislation" remain the same over time. In fact, new issues arise with
changes in technology, society, and politics, so that the later legislature will always have the
opportunity to address policy questions that earlier legislatures could not have envisioned.
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constitutional authority to accomplish its goals by affirmative enactment,
thereby presupposing the invalidity of a contrary entrenchment. The upshot
is that the anti-entrenchment position is forced to treat the parallel issues of
entrenching clauses and sunset clauses in an oddly asymmetrical fashion
without any (nonarbitrary) justification for doing so.
A second argument is that the sheer antiquity of the anti-entrenchment
rule is a good constitutional reason for reading it into Article 1. The maxim
that no legislature may bind its successors is sometimes said to have deep
roots in Anglo-American law;32 on originalist premises we might take that
maxim as a background assumption of the Founding generation, one that
informs the meaning of "legislative Powers herein granted." But it turns
out to be remarkably hard to find endorsements of the anti-entrenchment
rule, or any of its equivalents, in the canonical originalist sources. Hamilton
assumed in The Federalist No. 78 that the last-in-time rule would govern
federal statutes.33 But he, like Blackstone, called it a "mere rule of
construction" applicable when the relevant statutes are silent about their
relative priority, suggesting that he was not speaking to the constitutional
question about intertemporal choice-of-law.34 If Hamilton meant to invoke
only a rule of statutory interpretation then his analysis is consistent with
ours, as discussed below.35 On the other side of the originalist ledger,
Madison himself recognized the validity of entrenching statutes by
classifying political acts into three categories: (1) constitutions; (2) laws
irrevocable at the will of the legislature; and (3) ordinary laws that are not
irrevocable.36
The larger point, of course, is that these evidentiary fragments are
irrelevant even on originalist premises. Even were some constitutional
historian to discover unequivocal evidence that the Framers assumed
entrenching statutes to be invalid, that evidence would demonstrate no more
than a background assumption at the level of specific intentions, an
assumption untethered to any particular constitutional text. This is among
the weakest forms of originalist evidence, and, as previously discussed, it
contradicts the express textual listing, in Article I, Section 9, of other
common-law maxims as restrictions on the federal legislative power. For
similar reasons, constitutional practice often refuses to interpolate the
Framers' unarticulated assumptions into capacious constitutional texts, such
as the grant of "legislative Powers." Consider that many members of the
Founding generation assumed the existence of substantive natural law
32. See, e.g., McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 4, at 505.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 30, at 439 (Alexander Hamilton).
34. Id.; see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 1, at *90 (listing the anti-entrenchment principle
that "[a]cts of parliament derogatory from the power of subsequent parliaments bind not" among
other "rules to be observed with regard to the construction of statutes").
35. See infra Subsection I.D.l.f.
36. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, supra note 17, at 230.
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restrictions on legislative authority, restrictions that the Supreme Court has,
by and large, declined to read into Article I.
A better version of the argument from tradition is not originalist but
straightforwardly Burkean. Tradition, on the Burkean view, has
constitutional weight independent of its embodiment in any text because
epistemic humility counsels deference to the accumulated practice of past
generations. 37 The accumulated practice of Parliament and of the Congress
in disclaiming the authority to bind their successors, or in ignoring
attempted bindings by earlier legislatures, has put an implicit restrictive
gloss on the Constitution's grant of legislative powers.
There is good reason to doubt the premise of this argument. Although
the historical literature contains no sustained modem treatment of
entrenchment and related practices, making it hard to be confident in either
direction, even a superficial inspection reveals a robust history of
entrenchment and attempted entrenchment by Anglo-American legislatures.
Dicey, writing in 1885, announced in sweeping terms that "[there is no
law that Parliament cannot change,"38 but he had to spend a lot of time
distinguishing contrary cases, because, as Dicey conceded, "[1]anguage has
occasionally been used in Acts of Parliament which implies that one
Parliament can make laws which cannot be touched by any subsequent
Parliament." 39 Thus the fundamental treaties of Union with Scotland and
Ireland, enacted by legislation in 1706 and 1800, respectively, were
entrenched against repeal by later Parliaments. Dicey said that those
framework statutes were violated or disregarded by legislation enacted in
the mid- to late nineteenth century.' He thereby wanted to conclude that
entrenching legislation cannot bind subsequent Parliaments, but we might
more plausibly see these as examples of highly successful entrenchments,
given that they had a lifespan longer than those of many constitutions.4 In
any event, those famous entrenching statutes formed part of the legal
background for the Founding generation in a way that their nineteenth-
century repudiations did not.
American legislative practice also displays a range of legislative
entrenchments, successful and unsuccessful. We subsequently discuss the
Senate's entrenched cloture rule-an old provision with roots in a variety of
37. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 894 (1996).
38. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 84 (8th
ed. 1915).
39. Id. at 62.
40. Id. at 63; see also 0. Hood Phillips, Self-Limitation by the United Kingdom Parliament, 2
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 443,461 (1975).
41. A recent example is the Northern Ireland Constitution Act of 1973, which declares that
Northern Ireland will remain in the United Kingdom unless a majority of its residents consent to
secession. Although the law does not by its terms entrench itself, that is a plausible interpretation.
See Phillips, supra note 38, at 445-46.
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even older legislative practices, like the filibuster, which modify the rule of
simple legislative majorities. Judicial decisions have enforced the rule
against entrenchments where the issue was justiciable," and those decisions
are one strand of our tradition, but the entrenchments that gave rise to them
are as well. The truth is that the place of entrenchment in Anglo-American
practice appears not monolithic, but contestable and contested, both within
legislatures and between legislatures and the judiciary. At the very least, the
argument from tradition outruns the work of modem scholars, who assume
far too confidently that the sweeping claims of older commentators like
Blackstone and Dicey accurately represent the historical record in England
and, even less plausibly, in America.
Whatever its historical merits, however, the conclusion of the argument
from tradition does not follow. On the tradition argument, the anti-
entrenchment prohibition arises principally from the (assumed) practice of
early Parliaments and Congresses-more specifically the anti-practice by
which early legislatures declined to enact entrenchments or declined to
obey them if enacted. But the failure or refusal to enact entrenchments no
more creates a constitutional gloss than does the failure to create, say,
administrative agencies; similar reasoning would have condemned the New
Deal out of hand. Even the stronger cases-affirmative legislative
precedents or statements announcing an anti-entrenchment rule 43-are
double-edged swords for the tradition argument. It is extremely odd to
defend an anti-entrenchment rule on the ground that the practice of earlier
generations, particularly early legislatures, has created a constitutional gloss
that binds succeeding generations. That is precisely what the anti-
entrenchment rule forbids, and all the normative arguments for an anti-
entrenchment rule are also normative arguments against taking the practice
of earlier legislatures as conclusive on the validity of entrenchment. An
argument that rejects the binding force of legislative entrenchment by
appealing to the binding force of traditional legislative practice has a self-
defeating air about it.
Those last points emphasize that an appeal to tradition is never a
conclusive argument in American constitutional practice. Our meta-
tradition, the only one we invariably adhere to, is to dump traditional
practices overboard when their claims on our rational or normative
allegiance wear too thin. Famous examples from adjudication are Erie' and
Brown,45 two landmarks of constitutional law that are landmarks in part
because they resolutely jettisoned normatively unappealing traditions. The
42. See cases cited supra note 3.
43. An example is the Septennial Act of 1716, which overturned the entrenchment of three-
year parliamentary terms enacted by the Triennial Act of 1694. See Eule, supra note 4, at 391.
44. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
45. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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equivalent legislative landmarks are Congress's large-scale experiments
with counter-traditional institutional arrangements during Reconstruction,
the New Deal, and the Great Society. Such examples show that an appeal
always lies from traditional practices to higher norms.
At most, tradition creates a presumption rebuttable by normative
argument. Once normative arguments are in play, however, tradition drops
out, and the debate's center of gravity shifts to the quality of the reasons
adduced to attack or defend entrenchment. Perhaps for that reason none of
the commentators who have tried to justify an anti-entrenchment rule has
rested solely on the tradition ground; all have advanced broader claims
rooted in constitutional and political theory. We take up those arguments
subsequently, and the discussion there supplies our reasons for advocating
that the anti-entrenchment rule, however traditional, be discarded.
b. The Article V Amendment Process
The argument based on the definition of "legislative Powers" fails to
come to grips with the Constitution's text or structure. The Article I Vesting
Clause functions only as a pseudo-textual vessel into which content may be
poured by an appeal to the equality of succeeding legislatures, tradition, or
some such norm. More convincing arguments might point to constitutional
rules with more internal structure. Article V's rules for constitutional
amendment,46 for example, support an anti-entrenchment argument in the
following form: Entrenched provisions are equivalent to constitutional
amendments because they trump the decisions of later legislatures. Article
V sets out the exclusive process for enacting amendments. Entrenching
statutes, then, are constitutional amendments enacted outside the exclusive
constitutional process for enacting amendments. They are thus invalid.
But even if Article V is the exclusive process for amendments, pace the
contrary arguments of Bruce Ackerman and Akhil Amar,47 there is a non
sequitur here. Entrenching provisions are not amendments, nor are they
"equivalent" to amendments in either a de jure or a de facto sense. Even in
a legal regime that permitted entrenching statutes, Congress certainly could
46. Article V states:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution. or, on the Application of the Legislatures of
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or
by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification
may be proposed by the Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. V.
47. See 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 266-94 (1991); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 457,458 (1994).
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not pass a statute that purported to expand the constitutional powers of
government or to repeal constitutionally mandated liberties, whereas a
constitutional amendment could do either of those things. Entrenching
statutes must, like ordinary statutes, be authorized by the Constitution; and,
like ordinary statutes, they cannot violate independent constitutional
restrictions. So entrenching statutes are just a unique legal instrument: They
differ from ordinary statutes in that they bind later legislatures, and differ
from constitutional amendments in that they cannot alter the constitutional
rules themselves. The question is precisely whether the Constitution permits
or forbids such an instrument. Pointing to Article V, which concerns a
different instrument altogether, is not responsive to that question.
Indeed, the argument from Article V gets the structural argument
against entrenching statutes precisely backwards. The Article V argument
says that entrenching statutes are constitutional amendments, but defective
ones, because they did not undergo the requisite constitutional process for
enacting amendments. The only structural argument against entrenching
statutes, however, is that (1) entrenched statutes bind subsequent
legislatures; (2) only a constitutional rule can bind subsequent legislatures;
(3) entrenched statutes are not constitutional rules; therefore
(4) entrenchments are invalid. The Article V argument supposes that
entrenching statutes are invalid because they are constitutional
amendments, but should not be; the latter argument supposes them invalid
because they are not, but should be. The pro-entrenchment position denies
(2) above, holding instead that a constitutional provision is not the only
legal instrument that may be used to bind later legislatures; entrenching
statutes may be used as well, and nothing in the Constitution indicates
otherwise. Article V, then, simply does not speak to the disagreement
between the anti-entrenchment and pro-entrenchment positions.
The real relevance of Article V is that it supplies an analogy in support
of the pro-entrenchment argument. Article V famously entrenched a
handful of constitutional provisions against subsequent amendment; two
such provisions subsequently lost their entrenched status by the terms of
Article V itself,48 but the provision that grants the states equal suffrage in
the Senate remains entrenched to this day.49 If constitutional framers may
entrench constitutional provisions against later framers, why may not
legislatures entrench statutory provisions against later legislatures? In
originalist terms, the Article V entrenchment of equal state suffrage would
have been meaningless, and would thus have failed to reassure the small
states who desired the entrenchment, if there were a background
48. The two provisions are Article I, Section 9, Clause 1 and Clause 4. Article V allowed
both provisions to be amended after 1808. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
49. See id.
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understanding among the Founding generation that the entrenchment clause
could simply be repealed through the ordinary process of constitutional
amendment. And in structural terms, the permissibility of statutory
entrenchment should follow a fortiori from the permissibility of
constitutional entrenchment. After all, entrenched legislation, unlike an
entrenched constitutional amendment, can at least be overturned by a
constitutional amendment in the ordinary course.5°
c. The Supremacy Clause
A similar anti-entrenchment argument might be made under the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI.5V ' Federal statutes, the argument would
run, are hierarchically inferior only to the Constitution. To say that a later
statute might be trumped by an earlier statute, if the earlier Congress so
provided, is to say that the later statute might be trumped by a
nonconstitutional source of law-a conclusion the Supremacy Clause
forbids.
But this argument fails for the same reason as the Article V argument:
The Supremacy Clause does not speak to the entrenchment problem and
cannot be tortured into doing so. The Clause merely says that the "Laws of
the United States" that are "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution are
supreme law. It does not speak to the intertemporal choice-of-law question:
As between an earlier entrenching law and a later inconsistent law, which
prevails? Both statutes are (apart from the entrenchment problem) statutes
enacted pursuant to the Constitution, so either answer to that question is
consistent with the supremacy of (otherwise constitutional) federal laws.
The target of the Supremacy Clause, of course, is not the intertemporal
choice-of-law problem, but instead a problem of federalism: Valid federal
statutes trump state law. The anti-entrenchment Supremacy Clause
argument has nothing helpful to say about the validity of entrenchment at
the federal level.
d. The Electoral Cycle Clauses
Eule grounds the rule against legislative entrenchment in an appeal to
the "spirit" of Article I, Section 2, Clause 1, and Section 3, Clause 1.52 The
first provides for biennial elections for the House, the second for the
(staggered) election of senators every six years. Eule's argument is that
50. We are indebted to John Manning for suggesting the argument in this paragraph.
51. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof, and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . .
52. Eule, supra note 4, at 405.
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entrenchment violates the temporal limitations on any given legislature's
authority that these Clauses embody. Insofar as this is a structural claim that
rests on a principal-agent model of legislative authority, we discuss it
below. Insofar as it is a textual claim, it is baffling. These Clauses simply
establish the electoral cycle; for example, they would prevent a Congress
from extending the terms of members. 3 They do not imply that Congress
may not enact an entrenching statute. Indeed, if the specification of the
electoral cycle had any implication for the temporal effects of statutes, the
more logical conclusion would be that they prevent an ordinary statute from
extending beyond the term in which it was enacted. The Clauses give no
reason for distinguishing entrenching statutes from ordinary statutes.
e. The Rules of Proceedings Clause
For completeness we should mention the Rules of Proceedings Clause,
which provides that "[ejach House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings." 54 Although this is most obviously an affirmative source of
cameral authority to enact self-governing rules-including entrenching
rules-a creative textualist might read the Clause to contain an anti-
entrenchment limitation as well. On this view, the grant of plenary
rulemaking authority to "[e]ach House" 55 bars entrenchment by an earlier
house of the legislature as against a later house. But, as Eule argues, the
reference to "each House" is not a temporal limitation, but just a corollary
of bicameralism. It establishes that each house separately, rather than the
Congress as whole, may make rules for its respective internal affairs. 56
f. Some Red Herrings
We have addressed only arguments from text, structure, and history that
supply constitutional objections to legislative entrenchment as such. In
many cases, arguments that claim to address the problem of legislative
entrenchment, or that might be thought to have relevant implications, turn
out instead to supply an independent constitutional objection to some
collateral feature of an entrenching statute or rule. These are not general
constitutional objections that support a general anti-entrenchment rule.
Consider, for example, the recent debate over the entrenchment of
voting rules, provoked by the House's adoption of an internal rule that
requires a three-fifths majority for tax rate increases. Scholars have attacked
the House rule's constitutionality on the ground that legislatures may not
53. As the Septennial Act did. See supra note 43.
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. ci. 2.
55. Id. (emphasis added).
56. Eule, supra note 4, at 409 n.139.
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require supermajorities in areas that the Constitution (implicitly) leaves to
rule by simple legislative majorities." Sometimes those scholars also
invoke the anti-entrenchment norm, 8 but the two arguments are orthogonal
to each other. We can imagine a perfectly coherent constitution that permits
legislative entrenchments, but that prohibits legislative alteration of voting
rules in particular. On this view, the structural argument that simple
majority voting is the (implicit) mandatory rule for congressional voting,
except where the constitution expressly says otherwise, is no more relevant
to the entrenchment problem than is, say, the Free Speech Clause. That
Clause bars contrary statutes and rules, whether or not the statutes contain
entrenchment provisions. The same is true of Rubenfeld's textual argument
that the House supermajority rule is inconsistent with Article I's grant of
authority to Congress to "pass" bills,59 which is no more relevant to the
entrenchment question than would be a claim that the supermajority rule
violates the equal protection of the laws.
In general, it should be clear both that Congress may not enact an
entrenching law that purports to alter the terms of Article I, and that the
defect of such a law is unrelated to the entrenchment problem. Article I
mandates bicameralism and presentment: Bills must not only be "passed,"
but must also be (1) passed by both houses, and (2) either signed by the
President or repassed by two-thirds majorities in both houses.6" Any law
that tinkers with any aspect of this procedure-say, by mandating that only
one house may pass bills, or that a vetoed bill becomes law with a
subsequent majority vote-is unconstitutional for precisely the same reason
that a law abridging the freedom of speech is unconstitutional. 6 1 But that is
true whether or not the law also contains an entrenchment provision; the
two issues are unrelated.
When Article I is thought relevant to the entrenchment question, the
analytic mistake is the failure to distinguish the constitutional rules
governing statutory enactment from the constitutional rules that determine
whether duly enacted statutes are binding law. A statute enacted in full
conformity with the Article I procedures may nonetheless fail to be binding
federal law. It may, for example, violate some independent provision of the
Constitution, such as the Free Speech Clause. Thus, valid enactment is a
necessary, but insufficient, condition for status as binding law; Article I
precludes statutes not enacted in accordance with its terms but does not
guarantee that validly enacted statutes have legal force. So the disagreement
57. Bruce Ackerman et al., An Open Letter to Congressman Gingrich, 104 YALE L.J. 1539,
1541 (1995).
58. Id. at 1542.
59. Jed Rubenfcld, Rights of Passage: Majority Rule in Congress, 46 DUKE L.J. 73, 74
(1996).
60. U.S. CONST. arLt. , § 7, cls. 2-3.
61. Kahn, supra note 4, at 194.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1684 [Vol. 111: 1665
Legislative Entrenchment
over entrenchment is a disagreement about what conditions, in addition to
valid enactment, a statute must satisfy to count as binding law. The anti-
entrenchment position holds that only a constitutional rule may trump a
validly enacted statute. The pro-entrenchment position holds that a validly
enacted statute may be trumped, not only by a constitutional provision, but
also by an earlier validly enacted statute (if the earlier legislature chose to
entrench that earlier statute). The Article I rules that determine whether a
statute has been validly enacted have nothing to say about that
disagreement.
A final confusion arises from the interplay between the constitutional
problem of legislative entrenchment and associated problems of statutory
interpretation. The last-in-time rule for statutes is, as we have said, a rule of
constitutional law, not an interpretive doctrine. Where an earlier and a later
statute are in irreconcilable conflict, the last-in-time rule decides the
intertemporal choice-of-law problem in favor of the later enacted statute.
By arguing that legislative entrenchment is unobjectionable we are also
arguing that the last-in-time rule is mistaken. Our argument, however,
entails only that an upstream Congress may, if it chooses, provide that a
statute shall be entrenched as against later Congresses. Whether the
upstream Congress has indeed chosen to do that is a conventional problem
of statutory interpretation, to be resolved by whatever tools the relevant
interpretive theory makes available.
Those tools might well include a presumption against legislative
entrenchment, so that an earlier statute that is silent on the entrenchment
issue would be taken not to entrench itself.62 That default rule would just
parallel the default rule used in the mirror-image case of sunset clauses.
Congress has the undisputed authority to provide that statutes will lapse
after a given period, but statutes that are silent on whether they are to
remain in force indefinitely will be taken to remain in force indefinitely,
rather than being interpreted to contain an implicit sunset clause. The
general default rule, then, would just be that statutes remain in force unless
and until overridden by a subsequent Congress, unless the earlier Congress
explicitly provides to the contrary.
2. Simple (Time-Bound) Majoritarianism
The constitutional arguments we have been discussing obtain their
force not from the text or other historical materials, but from unarticulated
theories of democracy that are thought to be implicit in constitutional
62. See H.C. 98/69, Bergman v. Minister of Fin. & State Comptroller, 23(1) P.D. 693 (Isr.)
(applying a similar interpretive presumption, but upholding the Knesset's constitutional authority
to entrench basic laws as against future Knessets).
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tradition. A few authors have brought these theories to the surface.
Examination of them, however, reveals no grounds for believing that
entrenchment is unconstitutional.
Dana and Koniak object to entrenchment on the ground that it violates
what we call simple, time-bound majoritarianism.63 On this view, the
Constitution provides that when a majority in each house passes a bill, and
the President does not veto it, the bill becomes law. Exceptions to simple
majoritarianism are explicitly laid out in the Constitution, but when there is
no question of overriding a veto, consenting to a treaty, and so forth, the
default of simple majoritarianism prevails. An entrenching statute violates
the rule of simple majoritarianism because it prevents a simple majority of
some future Congress from creating law in the domain governed by the
entrenchment.
Endorsement of the simple majoritarian view is surprising in light of
the formidable array of objections coming out of social choice theory. The
Condorcet paradox, for example, casts doubt on the premise that a simple
majority can in normal circumstances even be identified. Under quite
general conditions, voting will cycle rather than establish a majority
victor.' The bills that are regularly enacted owe their existence to
institutional structures and agenda control by party leaders as much as to
majority rule. We do not doubt that some legislative processes are more
legitimate than others, but we believe that entrenching procedure, in order
to avoid cycling and disruptive parliamentary maneuvers, might contribute
to legitimacy rather than undermine it. A legislative process that reliably
serves the interests of the public will likely have majoritarian elements, and
certainly democratic or representative elements, but there is no reason to
believe that it would incorporate simple time-bound majoritarianism.
The more serious objection to simple majoritarianism arises from
consideration of American constitutional practices. Recall our argument
that the Constitution does not by its terms limit the power of Congress to
bind itself, and indeed permits, or is conventionally understood to permit,
Congress to enact legislation that extends indefinitely beyond the expiration
of the legislative term. If there are political or logistical costs to repealing
legislation-and there surely are-then an earlier Congress "binds" a later
Congress by enacting legislation that cannot be costlessly repealed or
changed, except in those instances when it provides for the legislation to
expire on its own. Indeed, as we pointed out, one Congress would hardly do
a favor to a later Congress by making all legislation expire at the end of the
term, for this would impose on the subsequent Congress the burden of
63. Dana & Koniak, supra note 4, at 533.
64. See James M. Enelow, Cycling and Majority Rule, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE
149 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (surveying conditions that impact cycling in majority contests).
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renegotiating and reenacting the expired legislation. Short of anticipating
the needs and desires of future Congresses-which is impossible-a
Congress will inevitably burden future Congresses, for the simple reason
that the earlier Congress comes first and cannot avoid actions that will turn
out to hinder the later Congress.
As this objection is more complex than it might appear, let us examine
it in more depth. Recall PR*, which prohibits bicycle riding in the park and
also repeal of the statute with less than a two-thirds majority, and compare
it to a different hypothetical statute, PG, which provides that the smooth
concrete paths in a park are to be replaced with gravel paths. A simple
majority of the later Congress wants to allow bicycles in the park, but (PR*)
it cannot achieve a supermajority, or (PG) the majority is not willing to
appropriate funds to cement over the gravel paths.
Compare the two scenarios. In the first, there are no bicycles in the park
because of the entrenchment statute (the paths are cement), and in the
second there are no bicycles because of the cost of paving over gravel. We
might agree without much thought that the majority's preferences are
thwarted in the first case, but what do we say about the second? Do we say
that the majority's preferences are vindicated because the majority does not
want to pay to replace gravel with cement, or that they are thwarted because
the earlier majority's stratagem of replacing cement with gravel (for no
other purpose than to keep bicycles out of the park in the future) prevents
the majority's goal of permitting bicycles in the park?
There is no good answer to the last question because when we talk
about a majority's preferences, we usually take the past as given, and the
majority's preference-to change the status quo, whatever it is-is either
incorporated into a statute or not, depending on the nature of the relevant
political institutions. We might complain about the political process if a
majority's preference-to pave over the gravel, for example-is not
incorporated into a statute; we blame the cloture rule, or the committee
barons, or whatever. But we do not usually complain if a majority's
preference-to pave over the gravel at no cost-cannot be vindicated
because it is impossible.
PG and PR* both make a simple majority's preference for bicycles in
the park impossible, and they do so by making it too costly, in financial or
political terms, to create the conditions in which bicycling is possible. PG
accomplishes this goal by altering the physical environment; PR*
accomplishes this goal by altering the institutional environment. If PG is
permitted, why not PR*?
One might argue that the difference is that installing gravel paths is a
physical thing that cannot be costlessly undone, and entrenching is merely
formal rather than real. But institutional structures are just as real as
physical ones; both can be costly to change. We do not deny the existence
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of an analytic distinction between formal entrenching statutes and statutes
that change the physical environment. We deny that this distinction reflects
substantive policy concerns, and we suspect that those who want to
distinguish PR* and PG assume that when legislatures make physical
changes to the environment, such as the installation of a gravel path, they
are presumptively serving the public interest. By contrast, an entrenching
statute, it is asserted, is designed only, or mainly, to interfere with future
majorities; that is why entrenching statutes should not be permitted."
The problem with this view is that it ignores the many benefits of
entrenchment, benefits every bit as real as the aesthetic benefits of gravel
paths. We enumerated several of these benefits above: enabling a
legislature to commit itself, to enact stable laws, and so forth. Entrenching
laws, like ordinary laws, have benefits and disadvantages, and neither can
be considered superior from the perspective of simple majoritarianism.
3. Agency Theory
Eule proposes a variant of simple majoritarianism, which he calls an
"agency theory." According to this theory, the Constitution sets up an
agency relationship between Congress and the people, and entrenchment
violates this relationship. The key assumption is that Congress's agency
extends only until the next election. Eule's view is similar to that of Dana
and Koniak, except that he recognizes that the agency relationship is shaped
by the nonmajoritarian provisions in the Constitution. 66
Eule perceives the commercial analogy but fumbles it. In a corporation,
the shareholders play the role of principal and the board plays the role of
agent. As Eule recognizes, the corporate agent can frequently make
decisions that affect the future-for example, it can commit the principal to
a contract that extends long after the agent's expected or contractual date of
departure, or, for that matter, buy some property on the principal's behalf,
property that the principal will hold long after the agent departs. This is no
different from the role of Congress. It, too, can purchase some property on
behalf of the people, and the people will still have it long after the next
election.
Eule claims that, although a corporate board can commit future boards
to a contractual relationship, Congress cannot.67 Why this difference? "The
65. Something like this view seems to underlie Klarman's argument that "[an important
distinction exists .. between today's majority exercising sovereignty over the present in a way
that unavoidably affects the future and today's majority seeking direct control over the future in a
manner that is unnecessary to implementing its complete control over the present." Klarman,
supra note 6, at 505. On Klarman's view, only the latter counts as illegitimate "cross-temporal
entrenchment." See id. at 505-07.
66. Eule, supra note 4, at 399.
67. Id. at 405 n.121.
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reason that the agent of limited duration [the corporate board] enjoys this
power [to bind future boards] is... because the principal intends it." 68 Eule
acknowledges that shareholders want boards to have the power to bind
future boards, but believes that the people do not want Congress to have the
power to bind future Congresses.
Yet we know that this cannot be true; our simple bicycle example
shows as much. Like a board, a Congress cannot accomplish the principal's
goals if it cannot engage in actions that influence the future. If the people
want Congress to have power-and the "people" surely want that, whether
the people are the Founding generation or a current public-then they want
Congress to be able to influence the future. There is no reason to believe
that the people do not want Congress to enact entrenching legislation; or, if
there is such a reason, Eule has not provided it, and we cannot think of it.
Indeed, the corporate analogy suggests the opposite. If the importance of
being able to influence the future justifies giving the corporate board the
power to enter contracts that bind future boards, why would the importance
of being able to influence the future not justify giving Congress the power
to enact legislation that binds future Congresses?
There is a way of distinguishing the two cases. When the corporate
board binds shareholders, it binds only those existing shareholders and not
people in the future. People who buy shares in the future do so voluntarily
and pay a price that incorporates the value of existing contracts. When
Congress makes commitments for the future, it binds people not yet born,
future immigrants, and others who cannot consent to the binding. But this
distinction does no analytic work. The people of the future are affected by
ordinary statutes-statutes to which they do not consent or in any way give
democratic legitimacy-and this is seen as unobjectionable. As we discuss
below, the fact that the future is in the hands of the present might be a
source of concern or not, but it does not have special implications for
entrenching statutes.
One might think that Eule's agency theory implies that statutes should
expire at the end of the congressional term, a result that would contradict
both tradition and common sense. His response-that future Congresses are
free to repeal the earlier statute or otherwise acquiesce in it-is inconsistent
with the agency theory, for it allows the early Congress to impose political
burdens on Congresses in the future. But the real problem with Eule's
argument is that it implies nothing about the power of Congresses over the
future: One could argue that if statutes expired at the end of the term, that
would be an unfair burden on future majorities-for they would have to
renegotiate and reenact the expired legislation-and would thus be
inconsistent with the agency theory. The agency theory is too crude to
68. Id.
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explain the proper degree of congressional influence on the future;
therefore, it cannot distinguish entrenching and ordinary statutes, both of
which unavoidably have future effects.
4. Public Choice Theory
Some scholars argue that constitutional law does, or should, mitigate
public choice problems-the influence of factions, as the Founders put it.
Takings law, for example, interferes (or should interfere) with the ability of
interest groups to lobby for property transfers that come at the expense of
particular members of the public.69
A similar view might lie behind the Open Letter's fear that
entrenchment of the tax rate would interfere with the power of future
majorities. 70 The Open Letter does not explain why the Gingrich Congress
would seek to restrict this power, and one could imagine explanations that
do not draw on public choice. But we suspect that the theory behind the
Open Letter was that tax policy was temporarily in the hands of powerful
pro-business interest groups, and that these groups were attempting to
influence legislation as far into the future as possible, at the expense of
future majorities not yet organized. This kind of reasoning can also be
found in Fischel and Sykes's critique of judicial enforcement of
government contracts when those contracts are interest-group deals rather
than transactions animated by concern for the public interest.7
The argument that a policy against entrenchment weakens interest
groups is implausible. Entrenchment is just a legislative tool, no different
from any other. Critics of entrenchment must show that good use of
entrenchment is outweighed by abuse, and that entrenchment lends itself to
abuse more than other legislative powers do.
One such argument might be that because an interest-group deal
incorporated in an entrenching statute is worth more than an interest-group
deal incorporated in an ordinary statute, lobbyists will pay more for an
entrenching statute than for an ordinary statute. Thus, a constitutional ban
on entrenchment would reduce rent-seeking. Because entrenching statutes
place areas of legislative action off limits or nearly off limits, however, they
reduce the incentive to lobby after they are enacted. Interest groups might
pay more for an entrenching statute than for a single ordinary statute, but
over time they might pay as much defending nonentrenched interest-group
deals against legislative revision as they pay lobbying for entrenched
69. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985).
70. Ackerman et al., supra note 57, at 1542.
71. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract, I
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 334 (1999).
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interest-group deals in the first place.72 The logic underlying the critique of
entrenchment is perverse, for it implies that the public harm caused by a
statute increases monotonically with the length of its period of
effectiveness, and hence that all statutes should at least be subject to sunset
provisions, and probably should not be permitted to exist in the first place.
A final argument against entrenchment is based on a kind of risk
aversion. It might be thought that an entrenching statute is intrinsically
more dangerous than ordinary statutes. Ordinary statutes that are bad can
always be repealed; a bad entrenching statute cannot be repealed, or can be
repealed only with difficulty. Thus, even if we think that entrenching
statutes respond to the same mix of motivations as do ordinary statutes, we
might think that courts should regard entrenching statutes with greater
hostility, because the bad entrenching statutes can do much more harm than
the bad ordinary statutes.
This argument is unpersuasive. Legislatures have immense powers and
can do all the harm they want even without using an entrenchment statute.
Such power is tolerated despite the dangers because legislatures are
confronted with significant problems and are in the position to do
considerable good. The risk aversion argument against entrenchment would
justify all kinds of bizarre conclusions. Legislatures ought to regulate the
mails-they can't do much harm here!-but they should not have the
power to tax. After all, the power to tax is immense, and a legislature with
bad motives could impose huge taxes (or bad taxes) that would destroy the
economy. Although legislatures might sometimes use this power for good,
the dangers when they do not are so great that on balance we should deny
them the power to tax. The structure of this argument is identical to the
anti-entrenchment argument, and equally perverse. People who fear
extreme abuse through entrenchment are driven by a fear of democracy, not
the institutional concerns that might justify giving legislatures some powers
rather than others.
But suppose that Congress enacts a radical statute-no more tax
increases, ever-and entrenches it with a supermajority, or even unanimity,
provision. Future governments will be paralyzed, and all because-let us
say-a temporary majority seized power during a brief, volatile period of
history. This cannot possibly be a tolerable state of affairs. Thus we must
oppose all efforts to entrench. Or so say the critics of entrenchment.
The problem with this argument is that the future is always in the hands
of the present, and entrenchment is only one of many devices that the
present can use to ruin the future if it so wishes. A crazy majority can do
any number of radical things. It could give away the treasury to a foreign
72. Id. at 342-44. We do not understand how Fischel and Sykes reconcile this insight with
their critique of enforcement of government-granted monopolies.
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country. It could abolish the military. It could sell off federal lands on the
cheap or authorize military adventures that ruin America's international
reputation. It could shut down executive departments and, in the process,
destroy expertise built up over decades. All of these activities would harm
the future-just as limits on tax increases would-and yet we do not, and
would not if we could, depend on constitutional prohibitions to prevent
them from occurring.
Rather than trying to ruin the future, current majorities invest a great
deal in maintaining institutions and natural resources for the benefit of the
future. Congress will not tie the hands of the future (which will often be
itself, in the near future) unless there is a strong consensus in the present,
just as most radical (nonentrenching) statutes are based on widespread
public sentiment. The parade of horribles is not on the horizon, and, even if
it were, the appropriate response would be a radical restructuring of
legislative power that might, but would not necessarily, impinge on the
power to entrench. (For example, we might want to give the states or the
federal judiciary more power rather than focus on entrenchment.) There are
a large number of devices for affecting the future. Simple majorities have
access to them. Entrenchment is just one more device, with its own
particular advantages and disadvantages, and no one has explained why
they are different enough, and sufficiently more dangerous, to warrant
taking them out of the hands of current simple majorities. The parade of
horribles provoked by thinking about entrenchment statutes is no different
from the parade of horribles provoked by thinking about democracy in
general. 3
5. Deliberation and Information
Some theories of democracy emphasize the importance of deliberation
in the political process. Laws do not (or should not) simply aggregate
preferences; they should emerge from a deliberative process involving
citizens and legislators, in which preferences change in response to
argument and experience. Theorists emphasize different aspects of
deliberation, some focusing on its instrumental value for good policy,
others on its intrinsic value to public life. We discuss both below.
A theory of deliberative democracy might seem to be inconsistent with
entrenchment. The problem with entrenchment from this perspective is that
it withholds from the future the ability to deliberate about legislation
concerning the domain of the entrenching statute. The future majority loses
the ability to use information that it has gathered in the intervening years,
and so cannot improve the entrenching statute where it fails to have
73. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181-83 (1980).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1692 [Vol. I111: 1665
Legislative Entrenchment
desirable consequences. Further, the future majority loses the intrinsic
benefits that come from deliberation.
These arguments, however, are subject to offsetting considerations. As
we have observed, entrenching statutes can be beneficial, and the
information costs must be weighed against the commitment benefits. It
seems clear that these costs and benefits will vary from case to case, and
there is no reason for a general hostility toward entrenching statutes per
se.
74
As for the intrinsic benefits of deliberation, the problem is not that they
are lost so much as that they are enjoyed by the current generation rather
than the future. But the future will be able to deliberate about other forms of
legislation. There is no reason to believe that there is a fixed amount of
legislation and that the current generation will "use it up," leaving the
future nothing to do and nothing to deliberate over. There is certainly no
historical experience suggesting that earlier legislatures try to deprive later
legislatures of topics to deliberate over.
Theories of deliberative democracy are pitched at a level of generality
that cannot shed light on the merits of entrenchment. Their authors are
concerned about the impact of technocratic elites on democratic institutions
and about defending democracy against rival political systems. Democratic
theory is not sufficiently precise to shed light on such narrow institutional
issues as the extent to which the branches of a democratic government
should be able to entrench their policy choices.
II. APPLICATIONS
Here we apply the analysis of Part I to a range of examples and
problems. Among the examples are provisions that effect entrenchments,
provisions that resemble entrenchments but really are not, and provisions
that effect partial entrenchments. Some of the problems are the
relationships between legislative entrenchment and government contracts,
entrenching statutes and internal legislative rules, entrenching statutes and
treaties, entrenchment and retroactivity, and legislative entrenchment and
entrenchment within other branches. As Eule and others have noted, there
are not many examples of entrenchments currently in force, but that is at
least in part an effect of the rule (and the supporting academic consensus)
that we are criticizing.
74. Eule, supra note 4, at 390-91.
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A. Easy Cases
We need not belabor the easiest cases under our theory: statutes that
effect entrenchment in a straightforward fashion, either by "permanently
establishing" a governmental structure or a substantive policy vis-it-vis
subsequent legislative action," or by altering voting rules or other
procedural incidents of subsequent legislative action. In either case our
position entails that these statutes are constitutionally objectionable, if at
all, only by virtue of their content-perhaps the Constitution puts the
substantive area off limits to legislative action, or establishes a mandatory
voting rule-rather than by virtue of their entrenchment.
B. The Senate's Cloture Rule
A classic entrenchment is effected by Senate Rules V and XXII. The
latter rule says that sixty votes are needed to effect cloture-the end of
debate on an issue subject to filibuster 6-- while the former rule, employing
self-reference, says that "[t]he rules of the Senate shall continue from one
Congress to the next Congress unless they are changed as provided in these
rules."77 Their joint effect is to entrench the supermajority cloture rule
against change by any simple majority in subsequent Senates, because a
motion to change Rule XXII would itself be considered (by virtue of Rule
V) in compliance with Rule XXII's supermajority cloture requirement;
similarly, Rule V itself could not be first amended by a simple majority.
Later Senates have in fact obeyed the entrenched rule. In 1975 a senatorial
showdown on the issue resulted in a determination, now recognized as an
internal precedent, that Rule XXII indeed bars a simple majority from
closing debate.7"
Is this entrenched cloture rule a good or a bad idea? It is hard to say, as
even those who criticize the rule on entrenchment grounds agree. Certainly
Burkeans should appreciate the rule's pedigree and venerability-the first
congressional filibuster occurred in 1790, and the adoption of the
supermajority cloture rule in 1917 represented not a departure from some
preexisting majority-rule baseline, but instead a liberalizing departure from
the earlier tradition, which required a unanimous vote to end debate. The
effects of a regime of filibusters and supermajority cloture, relative to some
75. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 (citing Reichelderfer v. Quinn, 287 U.S. 315
(1932); and Newton v. Comm'rs, 100 U.S. 548 (1879)).
76. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 106-1, R. XXII, at 21 (2000). The
principal category of Senate business that is exempt from the filibuster is the federal budget
process. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 215.
77. STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, supra note 76, R. V, at 5 (emphasis added).
78. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 212-13.
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majoritarian baseline, might be either to enhance or to undermine interest-
group influence, successful legislative deliberation, preference aggregation,
or other desiderata. Even the frequent complaint that the cloture rule is
antimajoritarian is off target, both because the supermajority requirement
for cloture is a rule about debate rather than a rule about the enactment of
legislation, and because the filibuster may counteract other antimajoritarian
elements in the Senate's structure, such as the committee system.79
In the face of these complexities, the leading academic critique of the
cloture rule explicitly disavows simple majoritarianism, relying instead on
the entrenchment objection. The entrenchment of cloture is said to
undermine "[p]opular sovereignty," to diminish "legislative
accountability," and to obstruct both "the legislature's inherent authority to
adapt to current circumstances" and "the right of the electorate to rule
according to its will."80 The right response to that line of reasoning is not
that the Senate is a "continuing body" -a bad metaphor made possible
only by the Framers' decision, quite reasonable as a matter of institutional
design, to stagger the Senate's turnover. The right response is that the anti-
entrenchment objection to the cloture rule is really a wholesale objection to
constitutionalism as such. In a binding constitutional order, neither the
future legislative majority nor the underlying electorate has any general
"right... to rule according to its will." True, the constitutional restrictions
come into force by a different procedure than do legislatively entrenched
rules, but that is a different, narrower objection; and as previously
discussed, it is also a question-begging objection, because it unjustifiably
assumes that restrictions on any given legislature may derive only from the
procedure for constitutional entrenchment, rather than from the procedure
for enacting entrenching statutes or rules.
But this is to go over old ground; all these are just applications of the
arguments from Part 1. Here, as there, the anti-entrenchment position risks
assuming a crude Jeffersonianism that proves too much. The position is
inconsistent, not merely with legislative entrenchment, but with the
acceptance of binding constitutions generally.
C. Gramm-Rudman
A contrast to the genuine entrenchment effected by the cloture rule is
the pseudo-entrenchment effected by the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, conventionally referred to as "Gramm-
Rudman."'" Although complex, and much modified by subsequent
79. For the latter idea, see id. at 217-23.
80. Id. at 249-50.
81. 2 U.S.C. §§ 900-908 (1994).
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legislation that structures the federal budget process, in its original form
Gramm-Rudman set federal deficit caps and required the Office of
Management and Budget to sequester funds appropriated in excess of those
caps. 2 Paul Kahn famously criticized Gramm-Rudman as an illegitimate
attempt by one Congress to "constrain" its successors;83 on this view, the
partial invalidation of Gramm-Rudman on separation of powers grounds in
Bowsher v. Synar was a sideshow, even a distraction, from the statute's
more basic flaw. But Kahn has it backwards: Gramm-Rudman contained no
entrenchment; its political effects were perfectly commonplace, and the
separation of powers challenge was the only colorable constitutional
objection.
The brute fact, one that Kahn cannot quite get around, is that Gramm-
Rudman did not entrench itself. A simple majority vote of any later
Congress sufficed to raise the deficit caps or repeal them pro tanto, and in
fact Congress has done just that on several occasions. Even if the structure
of the statute were thought to effect an implicit entrenchment, Gramm-
Rudman did not contain the self-reference that would immunize the
entrenchment from simple repeal; nor did it even contain a rule of statutory
interpretation, of the sort we examine later, to the effect that any repeal
must be express rather than implied.s5
Kahn says that Gramm-Rudman burdened subsequent Congresses de
facto even if it did not bind them de jure; the statute's calculus, the
argument runs, was that there may be a later majority willing to exceed the
deficit caps but unwilling to incur the political costs of overriding Gramm-
Rudman. This attempt to "change the effect of legislative inertia" reduces
"accountability" and makes it more difficult for future majorities to enact
their preferred substantive spending policies.8 6 But ordinary nonentrenched
legislation constantly does the same thing; Kahn's objection runs against all
statutes. The Endangered Species Act imposes a political cost on later
congressional majorities with different views about species protection-
majorities who might be willing to allow or even promote animal takings
and habitat destruction absent the Act but who are not willing to pay the
price attendant upon repealing the Act to accomplish those purposes. The
problem is that any statute changes the legal status quo and thereby shifts
82. Later modifications to Gramm-Rudman changed the deficit caps to spending caps and
worked other important alterations. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 12, at 433-37. None of that
is relevant to our concern here, which is just to draw conclusions about entrenchment from the
original Gramm-Rudman law.
83. Kahn, supra note 4, at 203-04.
84. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
85. Kahn says that the statute contains an implicit provision, inferable from its structure, that
any repeal must be express. Kahn, supra note 4, at 202 n.61. That is the sort of claim that makes
people dismiss statutory interpretation as a game without rules.
86. id. at 205, 209.
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the burden of inertia from the enacting legislature to future legislatures, and
might in that sense be said to reduce accountability and to frustrate the
future majority's will. The "entrenchment" objection to Gramm-Rudman
proves, if anything, that all statutes should lapse with the enacting
Congress.
D. Statutory Rules of Statutory Interpretation
Intermediate between the genuine entrenchment effected by Senate
Rules V and XXII on the one hand and the pseudo-entrenchment effected
by Gramm-Rudman on the other are a handful of congressionally enacted
rules that attempt to control the courts' interpretation of enactments by
subsequent Congresses. The most familiar examples are the interpretive
rules of the Dictionary Act 87 and scattered provisions in 1 U.S.C. 8 Consider
1 U.S.C. § 108, which says that "I[w]henever an Act is repealed, which
repealed a former Act, such former Act shall not thereby be revived, unless
it shall be expressly so provided"; and § 109, which says that "[the repeal
of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty,
forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act
shall so expressly provide."" The most politically controversial of these
rules is the Defense of Marriage Act, which defines "marriage" and
"spouse" to exclude homosexual (and polygamous) unions,' but which is
about as interesting for the theory of entrenchment as the provision that
defines a "county" to include a parish.91
Entrenched interpretive rules that are more consequential appear
elsewhere in the Code. The Administrative Procedure Act contains a clause
providing that a "[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or
modify this subchapter... except to the extent that it does so expressly" ;92
while the National Emergencies Act provides even more forcefully that
"[n]o [subsequent] law.., shall supersede this title unless it does so in
specific terms, referring to this title, and declaring that the new law
supersedes the provisions of this title."9 3 There are similar examples in the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act' and the McCarran-Ferguson Act.95
87. Dictionary Act, ch. 71, § 2, 16 Stat. 431, 431 (1871).
88. 1 U.S.C. §§ i-7, 101-114 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
89. 1 U.S.C. §§ 108-109 (1994).
90. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. V 1999); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (Supp. V 1999).
91. 1 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
92. 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1994).
93. 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(b) (1994) ("Federal statutory law ... is subject to this chapter
unless such law explicitly excludes such application by reference to this chapter.").
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994) ("No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate,
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of
insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates
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Such requirements of express repeal are partially entrenched because
they override the ordinary interpretive canon that permits, but disfavors,
repeals by implication.96 Imagine a court confronted with a later statute that
(on the prevailing interpretive theory) strongly but implicitly contradicted
the earlier statute, which itself contained a requirement of express repeal; an
example might be a later statute that appeared to extinguish a preexisting
statutory liability, contrary to I U.S.C. § 109, but did not do so expressly.
Under ordinary interpretive doctrine, absent the entrenching clause, the
court would be highly reluctant to conclude that the later statute effects an
implied partial repeal of the earlier statute's substantive provisions, but it
would so conclude if the inference was inescapable. Requirements of
express repeal forbid the court to take that last step, and the self-reference
present in the entrenching provision prevents the court from holding that
the entrenching provision was itself repealed by necessary implication.
These provisions are not wholly entrenched, because they could be repealed
by a simple majority, but unlike an ordinary statute they could not be
repealed by a simple majority acting by implication.
For present purposes, the important constitutional point is that such
rules are objectionable, if at all, on grounds unrelated to entrenchment.
There are a host of good normative reasons for a legislature partially to
entrench interpretive rules, reasons of the sort that support entrenchment
generally. The precommitment story supporting the entrenchment of the
National Emergencies Act is obvious, and the Congress that enacted the
APA might justifiably have been concerned that future Congresses would
turn the procedural framework for the administrative state into swiss cheese
by enacting a grab-bag of implied partial repeals at the behest of future
interest groups. In such cases, a partial entrenchment-one that prevents
implied but not express repeals-is an eminently sensible technique for
calibrating the tradeoffs inherent in entrenchment. Enacting an express
repeal requires a degree of public visibility and legislative attention that
would assuage the entrenching legislature's concerns about interest-group
influence and decisional pathologies.
The relevant constitutional objection to such provisions sounds not in
entrenchment but in the separation of powers. It might be argued that courts
should have exclusive control of interpretive rules, either for the structural
reason that the power to enact laws should be separated from the power to
interpret them, or for the functional reason that judges and lawyers possess
to the business of insurance .. "); see also Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, ch. 44, § 2
("Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared by an Act of Parliament of Canada
that it shall operate notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so construed and applied as
not to abrogate, abridge or infringe... any of the rights or freedoms herein recognised and
declared."), quoted in Phillips, supra note 40, at 477.
96. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (holding that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 did not implicitly repeal the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934).
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accumulated interpretive expertise superior to that of legislators. These
arguments are vulnerable to serious objections, but the contestable issue
concerns the relation between Congress and the courts, not the relation
between one Congress and its successors.
E. Hybrid Entrenchments
Congress occasionally enacts a statute that establishes or regulates the
internal legislative procedures that are to govern the enactment of future
legislation-procedures that would otherwise be established or regulated by
each house separately-pursuant to the Rules of Proceedings Clause.
Consider the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act,97 which barred
consideration by either house of Congress of certain resolutions concerning
energy policy, or, more interestingly, the recent Congressional Review
Act,98 which establishes special internal legislative procedures for
disapproving proposed agency regulations. In these instances and all others
of which we are aware, however, Congress inserts an anti-entrenchment
proviso that subjects the statute to override by a subsequent internal
legislative rule of either house, in the ordinary course." Congress thereby
avoids what we will call a "hybrid" entrenchment problem: Absent the
avoiding proviso, Congress would be entrenching internal legislative rules
by means of an earlier statute, not an earlier rule. The mirror-image case
would be an internal legislative rule purporting to entrench a procedure
against subsequent statutory change, but we are aware of no real-world
examples.
On our analysis, it is straightforward that Congress ought not to shy
away from enacting hybrid entrenchments if the ground for its concern is
that entrenchment is constitutionally objectionable. But the provisos
inserted under current practice are plausibly defensible on other grounds.
Statutes that regulate the internal procedure of both houses may undermine
bicameralism and the Rules of Proceedings Clause by forcing each house to
share power over its own procedures with the other. They may undermine
the separation of powers as well, by giving the President a share of power
over internal legislative procedures, either ex ante or ex post, through
threatened or actual vetoes of statutes that create or repeal hybrid
97. 15 U.S.C. §§ 719a-719o; see also Metzenbaum v. FERC, 675 F.2d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(holding that alleged violations of the Act's procedural requirements are nonjusticiable).
98. 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (Supp. V 1999).
99. The statute provides:
This section is enacted by Congress ... with full recognition of the constitutional right
of either House to change the rules (so far as relating to the procedure of that House) at
any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent as in the case of any other rule of
that House.
Id. § 802(g).
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entrenchments. These constitutional claims are sketchy, but we need only
gesture in their direction, for they serve only to emphasize that the
longstanding congressional reluctance to enact hybrid entrenchments is
justifiable, if at all, on constitutional grounds unrelated to the validity of
legislative entrenchment.
F. Government Contracts
A government contract, like an entrenching statute, imposes a cost-
albeit fiscal rather than political--on future legislatures that seek to escape
the consequences of the earlier action. To avoid performing the contract,
the future legislature must pay damages. To avoid complying with the
entrenching statute, the future legislature must achieve a supermajority
vote, if the entrenching statute so permits.
From a doctrinal perspective, the two kinds of government action are
distinguishable. Breach of a government contract falls under the Takings
Clause l°° or the Contracts Clause.'' The contract right is said to be a
property right, so the breach is a taking of the property right. If there were a
valid constitutional argument against entrenchment, it could not appeal to
the current understanding of the Takings Clause. Expectations based on
existing statutes are not considered property rights, so repeal or amendment
of those statutes does not count as a taking.
From a theoretical perspective, however, government contracts and
entrenching statutes are similar. Critics of entrenchment must explain how
their position can be reconciled with enforcement of government contracts,
or else accept that governments should not be compelled to pay their debts
and comply with other contracts." 2 Eule realizes that his position on
entrenchment is in tension with judicial enforcement of government
contracts. 0 3 He accordingly criticizes enforcement of government contracts,
but without acknowledging as he should that this longstanding tradition
casts doubt on his positive claim that his agency theory describes
constitutional practices. Our position is that entrenchment concerns by
100. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
101. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall.., pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... ).
102. One of us has expressed doubt about whether courts should enforce government
contracts for the purpose of maximizing utility across generations. That argument asserts a claim
about judicial policy, not constitutional law, and depends on certain premises-about the role of
courts in maximizing welfare and the relationship between courts and the legislature-from which
we abstract for the purposes of this Essay. See Eric A. Posner, Should Courts Enforce
Government Contracts? (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
103. Eule, supra note 4, at 420.
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themselves present no objection to government contract enforcement, a
conclusion that the Supreme Court appears to have adopted."°
G. Treaties
Treaties raise significant entrenchment issues. Although the United
States has not entered into a treaty that entrenches by its own terms,
entrenchment by treaty is a live issue elsewhere in the world." 5 The
European Community requires its members to conform their laws to the
laws of the Community, and to keep their laws in conformity with
Community law indefinitely."° A government that brings a nation into the
Community thus entrenches policies-the policies of the Community-to
which future governments might object.
In the United States, because a treaty requires a two-thirds vote of the
Senate, the Senate cannot abrogate an earlier treaty by consenting to an
inconsistent treaty with a simple majority; nor can a majority in both
houses-through ordinary legislation-abrogate the international effect of
treaty obligations." 7 As a consequence, the Senate (with the President) can
reach beyond its "temporal mandate" and entrench policies against the
interest of future majorities.
We take no position on whether the Senate should have this power;
what we emphasize here is that the entrenchment-like element of a treaty is
not objectionable, for this element characterizes-as we have been
arguing-all legislation, in the sense that ordinary legislation and
entrenching statutes alike restrict the choices of future legislatures.
H. Entrenchment by Agencies and Courts
Our argument-that legislatures have good reasons for entrenching
policy, and that the temporal consequences of entrenchment are not by
themselves objectionable-applies to agencies and courts. An agency might
bind itself to some policy by providing that a supermajority of its governing
104. See United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 881-83 (1996).
105. The closest such treaty is one between the United States and an Indian tribe, which
provided that it could not be repealed without the consent of three-quarters of the adult male
Indians occupying the land in question. This treaty entrenched policy indirectly by taking the
repeal decision partially out of the hands of American elected officials. The Supreme Court
refused to strike down a subsequent statute that violated the treaty, but on the ground that
Congress's power to enact such a statute was a political question, not because the treaty was
unconstitutional. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-68 (1903). Thanks to Phil
Frickey for bringing this example to our attention.
106. See Phillips, supra note 40, at 444.
107. See Eule, supra note 4, at 425 n.213 (discussing whether treaties entrench); Jack
Goldsmith, Rethinking the Domestic Priority Rules for Statutes and Treaties (2001) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
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board (if it has one) must approve changes in that policy. Commitment to
the policy and other reasons might justify such an action, just as they do for
corporations. The twist here is that Congress must authorize the
entrenchment in the agency's organic statute. Moreover, Congress also
retains an ex post statutory veto. This makes the case for permitting agency
entrenchment both less troubling for critics of entrenchment (because
Congress retains its authority) and less important (because agencies cannot
entrench themselves very well). At the same time, the creation of agencies
in the executive branch, and especially the creation of independent
agencies, seems to reflect efforts by Congress to provide the government,
through institutional specialization, with the ability to entrench policy. The
Federal Reserve Board, for example, reflects a historical effort to entrench
low-inflation monetary policy through an institution that can be tampered
with only at great political cost.
As for courts, stare decisis is a significant source of entrenchment.
When a court makes a decision, future courts treat that decision as an
authority, rather than (as they could) an irrelevancy. One common
justification for stare decisis is that it enables individuals to rely on judicial
decisions. This justification transfers to the legislative context: An
entrenched statute is more reliable than an ordinary statute.
Critics of legislative entrenchment need to explain why it would be
proper for courts, but not legislatures, to have the power of entrenchment.
Here is Laurence Tribe's effort:
[W]hereas neither a Congress nor a President is empowered to
make meta-law at the constitutional level necessary effectively to
bind future officeholders, the Supreme Court does in a sense make
constitutional law to be followed in future cases.... The Court can,
of course, overrule its prior decisions. But whereas the mere
election of a new President or a new Congress is sufficient, as a
matter of both political theory and political reality, to warrant a
repeal of prior law or policy, a change in membership of the
Supreme Court is not sufficient, under the Court's own prudential
and pragmatic principles of stare decisis[,] ... to justify overruling
a prior decision." 8
One problem with Tribe's argument is that, if the Supreme Court makes
constitutional law through interpretation, then Congress can make
constitutional law through interpretation, as Congress is, on most accounts,
authorized if not compelled to engage in constitutional interpretation,
especially in areas like impeachment where the courts stay out. Tribe does
not explain why a Congress should not consider itself bound to the
108. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 126 n.l.
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constitutional interpretations of earlier Congresses, and, if it should, why
legislative entrenchment would be more objectionable.
But the more significant problem with Tribe's argument is that the
Constitution does not say that Congress may not make "meta-law," or an
entrenching statute. We saw that Eule unpersuasively derived such a
prohibition from the clauses that specify the electoral cycle. In fact, the
Constitution gives Congress broad powers to legislate, and we have found
no reason to think that those powers do not extend to entrenching
legislation. Tribe's claim that entrenching legislation is constitutional law
because it binds future governments makes it seem as though Congress is
amending the Constitution in violation of Article V. But Article V refers to
"this Constitution" -that is, the document itself-and makes no reference
to entrenching legislation; entrenching legislation is not intrinsically
constitutional in any useful sense."°
Critics of legislative entrenchment ought to be critics of stare decisis as
well. When Jefferson expressed concern about the influence of the dead
hand, he concluded logically that legislation and the Constitution-positive
law and judicial interpretation-should expire at the end of a generation.
Our contrary view is that legislative entrenchment is no more objectionable
than the entrenchment of judicial decisions through stare decisis.
I. Retroactivity
Discussions of entrenchment frequently lead to the question of
retroactivity. Eule, for example, thinks that entrenchment and retroactivity
are two sides of the same coin-the temporal mandate enjoyed by Congress
as a result of its agency relationship with the people."' Anti-entrenchment
prevents the current legislature from controlling future majorities;
antiretroactivity preserves the current legislature's ability to control the
present unconstrained by the threat that future legislatures will change the
rules ex post. We do not take a position on the retroactivity debate, but we
do want to insist-against one reading of Eule's argument-that there is no
logical connection between retroactivity and entrenchment. Retroactivity
and entrenchment are unrelated, orthogonal issues.
Imagine a mini-legislature that is elected anew in every period P. An
"entrenching statute" means that the P, legislature may enact a law that the
legislatures at P,., and subsequent periods may not repeal. There are four
periods, P, through P,. There are no independent constitutional constraints,
like the Contracts or Takings Clauses. In this model, four legal regimes are
possible, as follows:
109. See supra Section I.D.
110. Eule, supra note 4, at 443.
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Regime 1 permits entrenching statutes and permits retroactive
legislation. At P2 the legislature has these powers: It may enact an
entrenched statute that the P, legislature may not change; it may enact an
ordinary prospective statute that will be in effect at P2, and at P3 unless the
P3 legislature repeals it; and it may enact a retroactive statute that will
determine legal relations as of P,. All three of these powers, however, will
be defeated by any entrenched statutes enacted at P,. A retroactive statute
that contradicts the P entrenched enactment will fail, but not because it is
retroactive; a prospective statute that contradicts the entrenched rule will
also fail, as will a new (but contrary) entrenching rule. Within the scope of
the entrenched rule enacted at P, the P2 legislature cannot govern legal
relations at any of P, P,, or P3.
Regime 2 permits entrenching statutes but forbids retroactive
legislation. The P2 legislature may pass an ordinary prospective statute that
governs P, and governs P, unless repealed; it may also entrench a statute
against the P, legislature, unless the P, legislature has enacted a contrary
entrenchment. Whether or not the P, legislature has entrenched anything,
however, the P, legislature cannot determine legal relations as of P,. The P,
legislature has to comply with the entrenched rules from P, and P, and
even if there are none, it cannot determine legal relations at either P, or P2.
Regime 3 forbids entrenching statutes but permits retroactive
legislation. The P2 legislature may set the rules for P, (by retroactive law)
and for P2 and P3 (by ordinary prospective law), but the P3 legislature may
change any of those rules-for P, or P2 by supervening retroactive law, for
P, by ordinary repealing legislation.
Regime 4 forbids both entrenching statutes and retroactive legislation.
The P, legislature may set the rules for P2 and for P, by ordinary
prospective legislation, but not for P,; the P3 legislature may set the rules
for P, and P, but not for P, or P.
All of these regimes are internally consistent. Eule sometimes suggests
that Regime 4 is internally inconsistent, because the ban on retroactive
legislation allows the P, legislature to "entrench" its rules for P, in
contradiction of the ban on entrenchment."' But Regime 2, which permits
entrenchment, also allows the P, legislature to enact rules for P, without
fear of later retroactive reversal. Eule's concern is just about the ban on
retroactive lawmaking; it has nothing to do with entrenchment. Of course,
we can if we like define Eule's point as correct by redefining
"entrenchment" to mean "passing a law that will be immune from
subsequent retroactive reversal." But what is the point of collapsing two
useful concepts into one?
111. Id. at 444.
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This establishes that, ignoring trivial redefinitions, there is no
relationship of entailment or of contradiction between views about
entrenchment and views about retroactivity. Now, we might have some
higher-order theory that dictates a view about entrenchment and also
dictates a view about retroactivity. For example, we might (like the other
half of Eule's position) have a simplistic principal-agent view that says:
The legislature elected for P, should be able to pass rules only about P,, P2
about P2, and so forth. This view entails that the P2 legislature should not be
able either to entrench against P3 or retroactively to govern P, (Regime 4).
That combination also accommodates the insight that the P, legislature;
cannot effectively control P, if (1) its policies for P, can be undone by
retroactive legislation at P2, and (2) citizens at P, know that (1) is true.
Regime 4 gives the P, legislature maximal control over P,.
But of course we might have some different higher-order theory. If we
believed in societal decline, for example, we might believe that each
successive legislature will be dumber than the last. In that case we might
like Regime 2, because it gives any upstream legislature more power than
its downstream successors. So we cannot avoid all the arguments that
Burke, Madison, Jefferson, and Bentham had about how policymaking
authority should be allocated across generations. But none of this shows
that, as Eule seems to think, there is some special connection between
entrenchment and retroactivity.
III. CONCLUSION
Politicians secure their policies against future modification by setting
up agencies and commissions, drafting legislation in ways that make repeal
especially visible, inserting procedures that alert interested parties to
potential amendments, committing the government to contracts, engaging in
deficit spending, restricting opportunities for debate in legislatures,
modifying the voting rules, and even ingeniously manipulating labels (as
Roosevelt was said to do, when he called his social security program, which
was a simple tax-and-transfer system, a pension plan). These are all forms
of entrenchment, and formal legislative and judicial entrenchment do not
pose different opportunities and dangers. Critics of entrenchment must
come to terms with the ability of legislatures to affect the future and explain
what makes legislative entrenchment special and worthy of constitutional
concern.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
17052002]
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
